How AI works

Which AI systems can have their logic audited, and which cannot?

Short answerRule-based systems, yes: a person wrote the logic down, so you can read the rule that produced a result. Learned systems, no. There is no written reasoning to read, only behavior to measure and test.

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Rule-basedLearned
Who wrote the logicA person
Where it livesRules, formulas, and tables you can read
ExamplesAn amortization formula, a tax table, an eligibility rule
What an audit can doPoint at the line that produced a result

Rule-based systems are deterministic. You can read the rule, point at the line that produced a result, and argue about whether the rule is right.

Learned systems derived their logic from data during training, and the result is stored as weights: billions of numbers that nobody, including the people who trained the model, can read as reasons. The behavior can be observed and tested. The reasoning cannot be inspected, because no written reasoning exists.

Where the law draws the same line

The word doing the work is infers. The test looks at what a system does, and it is the line the Act uses to separate AI from conventional software. California AB 316, in force since 1 January 2026, defines AI by the same test. For an organization, this decides which of its systems those laws reach: an engine applying a fixed eligibility table is ordinary software, and a model trained to score the same applications is an AI system.

Most real systems are hybrids

Most production deployments wrap a learned model in deterministic guardrails. The model is learned; the fence around it is written. So an audit splits in two. The guardrails can be read line by line: what the system may attempt, what it refuses, and what it records. The model inside can only be tested. See AI guardrails best practices, from proof of concept to enterprise for how guardrails are set up from proof of concept through production.

Sentinel, an AI gateway, is an example of the written fence. An admin sets its rule, either replacing the values it catches or blocking the request, and it records counts, which rule fired, and latency for each request. The model behind it can still only be tested.

That split is the useful one. "No customer account numbers leave the organization in a prompt" is a rule someone wrote, and it can be audited. "Explain why the model drafted this paragraph" cannot be answered from the model at all.

What this means for explainability requirements

A requirement to explain a decision can be met on a rule system: produce the rule. On a learned system there is no rule to produce, so the same words become a requirement nobody can meet. The answer that gets written is a document describing the model in general terms, and that document is what most explainability mandates produce.

  • Sort your systems first. For each AI system in use, record whether its decision logic was written or learned. A policy that asks both kinds for an explanation is asking for two different things.
  • Ask vendors which part is which. Which behavior comes from rules you can read, and which from a model you can only test? A vendor who cannot separate the two cannot tell you what an audit would find.
  • Write requirements against the fence. For learned components, ask for test results and a record of what the system did. Keep line-by-line explanation for the parts a person wrote.

Frequently asked questions

What is the difference between rule-based and learned AI?
In a rule-based system a person wrote the logic down, in rules, formulas, and tables you can read. In a learned system nobody wrote it: the system derived its logic from data during training, and the result is stored as billions of numbers no one can read as reasons. An audit can point at a line in the first and can only observe and test behavior in the second.
Why can't a learned model explain its decision?
Because no written reasoning exists. The behavior can be observed and tested, but the reasoning cannot be inspected. Asking why a learned model decided something is asking someone to read its weights, which nobody, including the people who trained it, can read as reasons. Ask for test results and a record of what the system did.
What can be audited in a system that wraps a model in guardrails?
The guardrails. Most production deployments wrap a learned model in deterministic guardrails, so the fence around the model is written and the model is learned. The guardrails can be read line by line: what the system may attempt, what it refuses, and what it records. The model inside can only be tested.
How do laws draw the line between AI and ordinary software?
By whether a system infers. EU AI Act Article 3(1) defines an AI system as one that infers, from the input it receives, how to generate outputs, and California AB 316, in force since 1 January 2026, uses the same test. An engine applying a fixed eligibility table is ordinary software, and a model trained to score the same applications is an AI system.
How should explainability requirements be written for AI?
Sort your systems first, recording whether each decision logic was written or learned, because a policy that asks both kinds for an explanation asks for two different things. Ask vendors which behavior comes from rules you can read and which from a model you can only test. Write requirements against the fence, and ask for test results on learned components.

Keep going

A practical next step

SUPERWISE compliance work covers the EU AI Act, SOC 2, and ISO 42001, where requirements written about a model have to be met with evidence about how it behaves.
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Sources

  1. European Union, Artificial Intelligence Act, Article 3(1), definition of an AI system; Articles 14 and 15.
  2. California Assembly Bill 316 (Krell), Artificial intelligence: defenses, chaptered 13 October 2025, effective 1 January 2026. Defines AI by whether it infers from input how to generate outputs.
  3. European Commission, Guidelines on the definition of an artificial intelligence system, February 2025. Official guidance on the elements of the Article 3(1) definition.
  4. National Institute of Standards and Technology, AI Risk Management Framework 1.0. Trustworthiness characteristics.